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NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
RECENT DECISIONS
A year ago, the Review undertook to examine North Dakota
Supreme Court decisions covering a two-year span, from September
of 1962 to June of 1964. The response of North Dakota lawyers
was encouraging. It was so encouraging, in fact, that the editorial
staff of the Review decided to sustain the project on a continuing
basis. However, to maintain a quality of freshness, the editors
believe that more frequent periodic surveys-hopefully two a year-
of the court's decisions are in order. Following are brief examina-
tions, topically headed, of some of the most significant decisions
handed down by the court during the year ending in June of 1965:
AUTOMOBILES
Guest Statute-In an action for injuries incurred in an auto-
mobile accident where the plaintiff was a guest passenger, the
Supreme Court affirmed the definition of gross negligence as pro-
vided in the guest statute' as meaning "no care at all, or the
omission of the care which even the most inattentive and thoughtless
seldom fail to make their own concern, evincing a reckless tempera-
ment and lack of care which is practically willful in its nature."' 2
The Court in addition specifically eliminated failure to keep a proper
lookout, excessive speed, inadvertance and involuntary dozing with-
out prior warning of the likelihood of sleep as not in themselves
constituting gross negligence. Holcomb- v. Striebel, 133 N.W.2d 435
(N. D. 1965).
Operator's License-An order by a District Court setting aside
a revocation of operator's license by the Director of Safety Re-
sponsibility Division of the Highway Department was affirmed by
the Supreme Court. The Court construed the statutory provisions
governing operators' licenses3 as providing for the right of appeal
except where the revocation is mandatory by statute.' Mandatory
grounds relate solely to the conviction of crimes where the existence
of facts sufficient for revocation have been established by a court
of competent jurisdiction. In those cases where the Highway Com-
missioner is required to evaluate the evidence, an appeal is avail-
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-03 (1960).
2. HIolcomb v. Striebel, 133 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 1965); Anderson v. Anderson, 69 N.D.
229, 285 N.W. 294 (1939).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-31 through § 39-06-39 (1960).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-31 (1960).
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able to insure operators "a judicial determination of the existence
of grounds sufficient to cancel their licenses. ' 5 Gregoryk v. Safety
Responsibility Division, 131 N.W.2d 97 (N. D. 1964).
CONTRACTS
Consideration-Declaring that forbearance to bring suit for en-
forcement of claimed legal rights is sufficient consideration to sup-
port a promise8 by the deceased to leave all his property to the
forbearer, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed a decision
which denied the right of a stepdaughter to specific performance
of an oral agreement whereby she agreed, following her mother's
death, not to make demand upon her stepfather for her interest
in her mother's estate. In return the stepfather promised to leave
all his property to her, upon his death. The action was brought
against the administrator when the deceased died intestate. The
court supported the plaintiff's theory that an implied trust was
created presumptively by operation of law7 and that a legal detri-
ment may be sustained by a promise to surrender a legal right,
whether such right has substantial value or not." However, the
Court did not determine whether the stepdaughter would have pre-
vailed had she commenced and tried an action at the time of her
mother's death. It also was apparent that the Court took into
consideration the lack of other heirs. Keen v. Larson, 132 N.W.2d
350 (N. D. 1965).
CONVEYANCES
Effect of Transfer on Solvency-On a question apparently of
first impression in the jurisdiction, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has adopted the view of California holding that to find a conveyance
fraudulent under Section 13-02-07 of North Dakota Century Code,
it is not necessary that the conveyance make the debtor insolvent.9
Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court and allowed a convey-
ance to be set aside wherein the debtor conveyed real property
to his wife without consideration, when he was pressed for pay-
ment of his accounts and threatened with foreclosure proceedings
on a large portion of other holdings, even though the conveyance
did not render him insolvent. The decision was based upon a similar
California statute ° and decisions rendered under such statute." The
Court also adhered to the requirement that it was necessary to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was actual intent
5. Gregoryk v. Safety Responsibility Division, 131 N.W.2d 97, 99 (N.D. 1964).
6. Frieders v. Frieders' Estate, 180 Wis. 430, 193 N.WV. 77 (1923).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-05 (1960); Redman v. Biewer, 78 N.D. 120, 48 N.W.2d
392 (1951).
8. Divide County v. Citizens State Bank, 52 N.D. 29, 201 N.W. 693 (1924).
9. Foss v. Wotton, 3 Cal. App. 2d 384, 44 P.2d 350 (1954).
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.0-7 (West 1954).
11. Freeman v. LaMonte, 148 Cal. App. 2d 670, 307 P.2d 734 (1957).
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to defraud, hinder or delay creditors.1 H. A. Thompson & Sons, Inc.
v. Hahn, 135 N.W.2d 166 (N. D. 1965).
MINES AND MINERALS
Oil Spacing-In a proceeding to review an order of the State
Industrial Commission denying an exception to a regular spacing
pattern in an oil field, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission.
The Court outlines the criterion required to meet the statutory
provisions 13 necessary to obtain an exception to a spacing order.
First of all, "a spacing order may not deprive an owner or lessee
of land of a fair chance to recover the oil and gas in or under his
land.' 1 4 An applicant for an exception to prevent confiscation has
"the burden of showing that he is entitled to the permit" and that
"the well is necessary to protect his right to recover his fair
share of the recoverable oil underlying his land."' 15 Finally, "the
right to be protected against confiscation under the spacing rule
is not absolutely unconditional or unlimited,"' 6 and where a situa-
tion has developed by voluntary acts of the parties after the rule
has attached to the property, an exception is not necessitated.7
Tenneco Oil Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n., 131 N.W.2d 722
(N. D. 1964).
MORTGAGES
Foreclosure as exclusive statutory remedy-Except for those
actions authorized by Sections 32-19-04 and 32-19-06 of the Century
Code, all actions upon a debt secured by a real property mortgage
only, without resort to foreclosure, are barred. Through a misunder-
standing, the mortgagee delivered to the mortgagor a satisfaction
of the mortgage in the mistaken belief that there was a contract
between them for payment of an additional $5,000. In fact, there
was no such contract. While the presumption that satisfaction of
the mortgage extinguished the debt which it was given to secure
was rebutted by conclusive evidence that the mortgagee did not
intend to satisfy the debt, the court held that the mortgagee was
barred by Section 32-19-07 from maintaining an action for any part
of the debt remaining unpaid, because the mortgagee had accepted
a payment to satisfy the mortgage without an agreement with the
mortgagor as to what the effect of the satisfaction would be. Loraas
v. Connolly, 131 N.W.2d 581 (N. D. 1964).
12. Hedden v. Waldeck, 9 Cal. 2d 31, 72 P.2d 114 (1937).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07 (1960).
14. Tenneco Oil Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n., 131 N.W.2d 722, 724 (N.D. 1964).
15. Id. at p. 725.
16. Ibid.
17. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Gulf Land Co., 122 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. 1938).
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NEGLIGENCE
Assumption of Risk-In a death action where the trial court
instructed the jury on contributory negligence, but failed to include
assumption of risk, which was pleaded, the Supreme Court reversed
the verdict and granted a new trial. Following an earlier opinion
which distinguished the affirmative defense of assumption of risk
from contributory negligence as operating independently of negli-
gence and proximate cause, 8 the Court held that the plaintiff may
have acted with due care but still have negated the defendant's
liability had the plaintiff assumed the risk. Assumption of risk is
defined as including three elements: "(1) knowledge of a situation
that was dangerous beyond that normally inherent in the opera-
tion.... (2) an appreciation of the danger and a voluntary choice
to encounter it, and (3) injury proximately caused by the danger
present."'19 Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145 (N. D. 1965).
Contributory Negligence-In an action arising out of an auto-
mobile collision the trial court instructed the jury on contributory
negligence as negligence "cooperating in some degree, though slight,
with the negligence of another. ' 20 The Supreme Court, reversing
the decision on other grounds, pointed out that the language "though
slight," if not erroneous in this case, should not be given as it
tends to confuse and mislead the jury. Judge Lynch, writing the
opinion for the Court, distinguishes earlier North Dakota opinions
where "slight" or similar language was recognized as being dictum21
or not specifically before the Court on appeal. 22 Slight negligence
is said to be no degree of negligence at all but a remote cause and
therefore not a proximate or direct cause. 28 Spalding v. Loyland,
132 N.W.2d 914 (N. D. 1965).
NEW TRIAL
New Trial as to one or more co-parties-Under the common law
rule a new trial as to some joint tort-feasors requires a new trial
as to all. Under the modern rule it is generally held that a new
trial may be granted as to some of the defendants and the judg-
ment or verdict allowed to stand as to others, if the new trial to
some of the defendants does not confuse the issues, and justice
does not require a new trial as to all. Although the modern rule
is not universally accepted, North Dakota numbers among the ma-
jority of jurisdictions which do adhere. Refusing to discard the
modern rule, the Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that
18. Borstand v. LaRoque, 98 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1959).
19. Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145, 164 (N.D. 1965).
20. Spalding v. Loyland, 132 N.W.2d 914, 918 (N.D. 1965).
21. Clark v. Feldman, 57 N.D. 741, 224 N.W. 167 (1929)
22. Ignatowitch v. McLauglin, 66 N.D. 132, 262 N.W. 352 (1935).
23. Huey v. Milligan, 242 Ind. 93, 175 N.E.2d 698 (1961).
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when a tort judgment against two or more defendants is vacated
as to one of them and a new trial granted, the trial court need not
for that reason alone vacate the judgment as to any of the others.
However, if it appears that because of an interdependence of the
right of the defendants, or because of other special factors which
would make it prejudicial or inequitable to leave the judgment
standing as to the others, then the "substantial injustice" exception
to the modern rule would apply. 24 The "substantial injustice" ex-
ception is used to accord substantial justice to a co-defendant as to
whom no error was committed, but against whom the judgment
might work an injustice if left intact. 2 The Court's holding is a rea-
sonable corollary to the express provisions of Sections 32-30-01 (2)
and 28-27-29 and Chapter 32-38 of the North Dakota Century Code.
Regent Coop. Equity Exch. v. Johnston's Fuel Lines, 130 N.W.2d
165 (N. D. 1964).
RECORDS
Microfilming-The North Dakota statutory provision for the use
of photography in making county records26 has been held valid.
Whenever the county register of deeds is authorized to do so, by
the Board of County Commissioners, he may microfilm the docu-
ments, instruments and decrees required to be recorded. In so
ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute is not am-
biguous, and microfilming, being a process of photography, is a
legal method of recording. However, Judge Strutz dissented, main-
taining that it was not the intent of the Legislature to make such
a "drastic" change to permit microphotographic copies of all re-
cordable instruments. He also said that a microfilm is not a "copy"27
since it is something from which a copy can be made, thus not
readily available to the general public as required. Rausch v. Nel-
son, 134 N.W.2d 519 (N. D. 1965).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Exclusionary Rule-The Federal2 s and State29 Constitutions guar-
antee the right of individuals to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure. How-
ever, the fruits of such searches and seizures have been admissable
in North Dakota Courts.30 Following the directive of Mapp v. Ohio, 31
which applied the federal exclusionary rule to state courts, and
dictum of an earlier opinion, 32 the Supreme Court reversed a con-
24. McCombs v. Ellsberry, 337 Mo. 491, 85 S.W.2d 135 (1935).
25. Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 S.W. 548 (1889).
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-10-19 (1960).
27. Blatz v. Travelers Ins. Co., 272 App. Div. 9, 68 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1947).
28. U.S. CONST. AMMEND. IV.
29. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 18.
30. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 20 , Q5 N.W. 67 (1925).
31. 867 U.S. 643 (1961).
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viction, of leaving the scene of an accident and for failure to render
assistance, on the grounds that prejudicial evidence obtained by
an illegal search was inadmissable. The court also adopted the
strict rules applied by the federal courts in determining if such
constitutional rights have been waived by the defendant. 3  State
v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91(N. D. 1965).
TAXATION
Commission Fees-The taxing power is exclusively a legislative
function. 4 A fee exacted on potatoes being shipped with the amount
to be determined and collected by the North Dakota Potato Devel-
opment Commission under the Potato Improvement, Marketing
and Advertising Act 35 was held to be an excise tax and therefore
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to an executive
board. The Court reasoned "that executive boards and officers
may not be authorized to exercise uncontrolled discretion in deter-
mining the amount of a tax" or the "area or areas in which they
apply." 3 This ruling raises serious constitutional questions regard-
ing other statutory boards and commissions which operate from
fees collected in such manner. The North Dakota Livestock Sanitary
Board, for example, has discretion as to what will be the fees
charged by the brand inspector, 37 while on the other hand the North
Dakota Wheat Commission 38 and the North Dakota Dairy Products
Promotion Commission operate on a fixed statutory fee. Scott v.
Donnelly, 133 N.W.2d 418 (N.D. 1965).
WATER AND WATER COURSES
Accretion and Reliction-Although it appears to be commonly
accepted that where land, which was riparian at the time of an
original survey, is lost by erosion so that nonriparian land becomes
riparian, and land is thereafter built by accretion to the land which
was originally nonriparian, extending over the location formally oc-
cupied by the original riparian land, the title to such accreted land
becomes that of the non-riparian land owner, the Court concluded
otherwise. In order to arrive at this decision it was necessary for
the Court to review its previous rulings and to attempt to deter-
mine the intent of the North Dakota Legislature by construing the
applicable statute.4 0 In so doing, it was found the statute was not
intended to be applied where the result would be to divest title in
32. State v. Govan, 123 N.W.2d 110 (N.D. 1963).
33. Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
34. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 175.
35. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 4-10A (1960).
36. Scott v. Donnelly, 133 N.W.2d 418, 419 (N.D. 1965).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-22-03 (1960).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 4-28 (1960).
39. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 4-27 (1960).
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-05 (1960).
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the riparian owner forever and vest title in the non-riparian owner
to the land rebuilt where the former land of the original riparian
owner was located. Judge Burke, in dissenting, agreed that if
weight were to be given to case law only the minority view would
be the better reasoned, but he asserted that the statute had been
the law of Dakota Territory and the State of North Dakota since
1870, and there was no basis upon which to modify the clear lan-
guage of the statute which states that accretions to the bank of a
stream belong to the owner of the bank. Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d
889 (N. D. 1965).
WILLS
Restraint of Alienation-Generally, when a will passes real es-
tate in fee simple to the devisee, any attempt by the testator to
restrain the devisee's power of disposition is repugnant to the nature
of the estate given.4 1 Therefore, when a testatrix conveyed title
to certain real estate in fee simple with the condition the bene-
ficiaries were to give her son "first option" to buy, the Court
ruled this was a limitation contrary to the interests created and
void under North Dakota Statutes.42 Even though the son's "option"
was held to be invalid, the Court suggested that had the testatrix
given defeasible titles the problem of what would happen to the
titles if the devisees failed to grant the son's option would no longer
exist, thus the beneficiaries' interests would have been subject to
a valid limitation. Holien v. Trydahl, 134 N.W.2d 851 (N. D. 1965).
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41. Langsten v. Wooten, 232 N.C. 124, 59 S.E.2d 605 (1910).
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-26 (1960).
